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I.

Introduction

A

well-functioning financial sector is a major ingredient for economic
growth and development in many respects. An efficient financial
system improves savings mobilization and financial intermediation,
allocates resources for productive investments and allows risk spreading and risk
pooling. An efficient banking supervision is essential to a virile and stable
financial system and also to foster the linkage between the financial sector and the
aggregate economy as well as to reduce the likelihood and magnitude of a
financial crisis. Recent development across the globe has shown that dynamic
diagnostic instruments are required for identifying and managing risks,
vulnerabilities and development priorities in the financial sector. The need to
address the unfolding complexity of supervising the banking system in the
context of a globalized world underscores the introduction of the joint IMF-World
Bank Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) in May 1999.
Recent experiences in many countries and the current global financial crisis
suggest that traditional banking supervision tools are not effective in tackling
sectoral imbalances, especially an overheated property market that could
eventually lead to broader financial crisis and macroeconomic instability. Given
the level of sophistication of the financial system, it has become quite easy to
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circumvent rule, compliance-based supervision. To capture most of the emerging
risks associated with financial growth and development, it has become common
place to replace rule-based supervision with a risk-based approach.
The need to ensure risk management dynamically evolved in line with
developments in the financial sector and the entire globe. Thus, from 2004,
national economies were made to buy into the development of Basel II
framework. This revised framework on "International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards", aims at building a solid infrastructure and
enhancing risk management, capital adequacy, market discipline, and financial
stability. It is essentially to ensure safety and soundness of the banking system and
encourage on-going improvements in risk assessment and management. The
main feature of this is that it is applied to suit the national circumstances and it is
not mandatory for it to be applied to all banks concurrently. Application is based
on level ofexposure to risks.

11.0 Framework for risk-based banking supervision
Within the context of globalization, boundary has become more important in
financial risk factors. Most domestic main financial system risk factors are linked
to global and domestic developments. The role of contagion has become very
significant in recent developments. A slowdown of the global economy in any
major trading partner tends to have some adverse effect on domestic economic
activity and, in turn, on the demand for credit and the quality of loan portfolios
(IMF, 2008).
The joint assessments of the IMF and the World Bank (IMF 2003) found that loan
evaluation and provisioning practices tend to be weaker in practice than they are
on paper, and exchange rate, interest rate and other market and country risks tend
to be underestimated. The fact that rule-based supervision is easily circumvented
by bankers makes new approaches inevitable. The report also made it clear that
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effective supervision of large and complex financial institutions, particularly
those requiring consolidated supervision and consolidation of accounts, has
become very challenging under rule-based supervision.
Financial risk is the possibility that the outcome of an action or event could bring
up adverse impacts. Risk by default has two components: uncertainty and
exposure. Banking sector risks can be categorized into four: credit risk (resulting
from a counterpart default), market risk (resulting from volatility in income or
market value due to fluctuations in such underlying market factors as currency,
interest rates, credit spreads, etc.), liquidity risk (not being able to meet
commitment or inability to liquidate assets at reasonable process when required),
and operational risk (resulting from inadequacies in the conception of
implementation ofprocedures) (Mirza, 2008).
A risk-based supervision allows scarce supervisory resources to be targeted at
funds which are viewed to be at most risk and allows supervisory authorities to
take a more pro-active approach, attempting to avoid potential problems before
they occur, as opposed to a reactive compliance-based approach (IOPS, 2007).
Risk-based supervision is a preventive tool often used to identify gaps in risk
management policies and practices before such weaknesses adversely affect
earnings and capital of the banking system. The risk-based supervision entails a
shift away from a rigid, rules-based approach to regulation and supervision
towards broad, principle-based prudential standards. This is otherwise called
"incentive compatible" prudential standards. This approach encourages banks to
develop and continuously update their internal risk management systems to
ensure that it is commensurate with the scope and complexity of its operations
(Watanagase, 2004; MSC, 2005).
Another attribute of this approach is its focus on steering a balanced course of
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action for each banking institutions and the entire system. It emphasizes a
forward-looking, longer-term analytical framework as opposed to relying solely
on a point-in-time analysis and evaluation of the banking system.
A well-managed risk-based supervision helps banking supervisors to properly
identify risks during economic expansion when bankers and monetary authorities
suffer from 'herd-like' euphoria that could be very costly to the entire economy.
The approach which is premised on sound judgment and critical analysis apart
from enhancing supervisory oversight, also encourages banks to enhance their
own risk management capabilities. Because this approach is driven by sound
judgment and critical analysis, a risk-based supervision framework requires bank
supervisors to be skeptical of conventional wisdom in good and bad times- and
never be excessively optimistic or pessimistic during economic boom or burst.
The Bank of Thailand is one of the monetary authorities that have structured and
risk-oriented approach to on and off-site banking supervision process.
Financial pro-cyclicality has played a major role in the emergence of financial
risks in many emerging markets in recent times financial market participants'
have strong appetite for risk shifts with changes with the economic cycle.
Financial pro-cyclicality arises whenever normal fluctuations in the business
cycle are exacerbated by market agents' tendency to behave in a 'herd-like'
manner as business cycles change. There is also a propensity for regulatory
policies and supervisory practices to reinforce and magnify this "herd-like"
behaviour of financial intermediaries (Watanagase, 2004).
Evidence across the globe has shown that during economic booms, bankers and
other financial operators are prone to excessive optimism and may be inclined to
justify the feasibility of increasingly higher-risk or be exceedingly involved in
adverse selection. This could partly be as a result of inflated collaterals,
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seemingly unlimited borrowers' potentiality and increasingly intense competition
among financial intermediaries. With financial pro-cyclicality, even the most
prudent lender may be tempted to relax its loan underwriting criteria and reduce
its lending rates charged to high-risk borrowers or risk losing market share to its
competitors (Watanagase, 2004). Since the banks' financial conditions appear
seemingly strong (robust earnings and low levels of problem loans), bank
supervisors may fall into the financial illusion associated with this euphoria and
thereby may see no problem in this risky behaviour. This euphoria has the
tendency to contribute to rapid loan growth with less capital, which sooner than
later, culminates into poor loan quality and pyramiding of doubtful loan
provision, while inadequate reserve levels becomes apparent. At this stage,
bankers' optimism turns to pessimism; this results into tightening of lending
standards, which to a large extent, eclipse creditworthy borrowers thereby
affecting genuine investments. Monetary authorities are also caught up in this
'herd-like' tendency by demanding higher reserves and possibly raise capital base
due to known asset quality deterioration. The decline in credit growth to genuine
investors tends to exacerbate the economic downturn. An important implication
of this is that bankers and financial regulators tend to underestimate risk during
economic expansion and overly pessimistic during economic recessions.

m.o

International Experiences
The emerging global financial infrastructure is changing the role of central
banking. In the context of globalization, the expansion of the financial markets
and the diversification of the financial instruments; measuring, identifying and
controlling the risk exposure in banks have become essential. Central banks are
no longer mere static financial system supervisors but also undertake a dynamic
review of the way banks are monitoring, identifying and quantifying financial
risks. In fact, since IMF signed agreement with most central banks not to control
capital flows, the way the banking system measure the vulnerability of capital risk
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has been evolving over time. Now, most central banks support and help banks in
building risk management infrastructure to measure, monitor and manage their
risk exposures.
The new economic architecture is supporting a risk-based supervision. This
realization emerged from lessons from the financial crisis of the 1990s and 2000s.
The financial crisis of different shapes experienced over the past one and a half
decades has shaped the face of risk management globally. For instance, the market
and credit crises (the 1994 bond crisis and the 1997 Asian crisis) and the
operational risk crises (the Barings PLC in 1995 and Enron in 2001) have shown
that earnings are the first source to confront losses. This, therefore, makes banks
to focus attention on measuring the vulnerability of their earnings to stress
situations. Risk management and stress testing are no more the primary
responsibility of financial regulators but also that of banks. For instance, in banks
such as the JP Morgan Chase, economic value stress testing and Value at Risk
(VaR) are very important tools in risk management practices. Economic value
stress testing is not only done for trading and non-trading activities using the same
scenarios but also tests its portfolio once a month to improve its understanding of
its risk profile and to determine how the economic value of the balance sheet could
be affected using multiple scenarios.
Many countries have achieved a good degree of compliance in banking
supervision and regulation and better ability of supervisory authorities to manage
the proliferation of financial services, undertake risk-based supervision, take
prompt corrective actions, deal with consolidated supervision, and cooperate with
other domestic and foreign supervisory agencies.

ID.I Europe
The growth of financial conglomerates, i.e., groups that simultaneously engage in
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banking, insurance and securities businesses, is posing its new challenges. The
major pre-occupation in Europe is to determine how adequate the tools are to
manage the risks they are exposed. This is based on the understanding that failure
of one of these financial conglomerates could pose serious threat to the financial
system. Developing an enterprise-wide risk management or aggregation
technique is a core priority for this group. They are yet to devise a technique that
handles different types of risk such as credit, market, operational and insurance
underwriting risks to a common standard (BIS, 2001 ).
The French experience shows that credit risk, represents 85 per cent of banks'
risks, followed by operational risk (10 per cent) and market risk (5 per cent)
(Central Bank of Egypt, 2007). Banque de France's experience shows that three
approaches are adopted in carrying out stress tests on credit risks. The first
approach, scenario analysis, measures the impact of macroeconomic stress
scenarios on different outcomes of bank's loan portfolios. The second approach,
sensitivity analysis, makes an ad-hoc shock on the corporate credit portfolio of
major French banks while the third undertakes shocks on the equity liability of a
single bank. Two type of models are used in doing this: the Margin Model
measures the impact of macroeconomic shocks on banks' profitability; while the
Transition Matrices Model measures the impact of macroeconomic and financial
shocks on credit risk. The objective of macro stress testing is to detect the link
between macroeconomic fluctuations and banking sector situation, measured by a
number of variables (credit quality, profitability and solvency) using a top down
stress testing.
The emerging issue is that banks now subject themselves to simple sensitivity test
and multiple scenario analysis. While the simple sensitivity test observes the
change in the portfolio of a bank due to the change in one risk factor, the scenario
analysis observes the change in portfolio due to the change in multiple risk factors
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simultaneously (e.g., equity prices, foreign exchange rates, and interest rates).
The latter approach is more demanding in terms of application because it involves
building sophisticated econometric models and simulation scenarios that reflects
the complexity of the market situations. This is the new face of risk-based
supervision in the new financial architecture. As a matter of fact, each bank will
have to do a stress testing exercise proportionate to the size of the bank and the
complexity ofthe institution, which explains why stress tests differ from one bank
to another; and it is beyond a rule-based imposed stress testing.

m.2 Malaysia
The Malaysian Securities Commission adopted the Compliance and Risk-based
Supervision Framework and self assessment by intermediaries in 2004, starting
with the fund management industry. This framework provides a more structured
and comprehensive method of identifying and measuring the qualitative and
quantitative risk exposures of its market institutions and intermediaries involved
in risk identification, measurement, mitigation and assessment. This approach
led to a more proactive and pre-emptive approach to risk management which has
also necessitated the establishment of management action plan (MSC, 2005). In
2005, the Commission used the framework to prepare the scorecard of fund
management industry which led to feedbacks from fund management participants
to develop action plans to mitigate high risks areas as well as cultivate a
compliance and risk management culture. This framework was later applied on
unit trust management, stock-broking firms and futures brokerage companies
between 2005 and 2006. The strategic shift from rule-based regulation to riskbased supervision was to enhance competitiveness, quality of markets and
intermediation, and international compatibility.
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ID.3 Nepal
Experience from this country revealed that excessive exposure of banks and
financial institutions to the share market led to a bubble. When the bubble busts,
the rise in non-performing loans (NPLs) led to a stress in the banking sector
(Nepal Rastra Bank, 2008). Besides, as a result of boom in real estate experienced
in the country, the banks and financial institutions provided loans to real estate
based on the market value of land and houses as collateral, a bubble in the real
estate market directly affected the banking sector. In addressing the emerging
challenges, the BASEL II was introduced for commercial banks. The existing
provision of capital adequacy ratio for development banks, finance companies
and microfinance development banks was initiated. The apex bank initiated a
proactive evaluation of banks based on the CAMELS rating indicators through
compulsory annual on-site supervision at the corporate level, compulsory on-site
supervision of the banks and financial institutions with poor financial health. The
implementation of Early Warning Signal (EWS) to banks and financial
institutions based on CAMELS rating, off-site supervision report on banks and
the auditing ofbig branches oflarge banks by external auditors were started.
ID.4 Mexico
A major strength ofthe Mexican financial system was the increasing transparency
and market discipline and the strengthening of the institutional framework for
financial oversight. A critical aspect of this is the improvement in accounting and
disclosure standards in the financial system. In addition to the limitation of the
previously unlimited guarantee on bank liabilities, the regulatory and supervisory
framework has registered remarkable improvements in quality and effectiveness
through increased operational transparency, improved market discipline and
strengthened institutional framework for financial oversight. In spite of this, the
financial system is still facing the challenge of distribution of regulatory
functions, coordination and regulatory and supervisory gaps. The financial
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system is overseen by multiple regulators which makes the country to experience
a fragmentation of supervisory powers' which weakened accountability and the
enforcement of rules and regulations (IMF, 2007). The use of forbearance in
addressing the 1994-95 crisis undermined the financial system credibility.
Substantial reforms have taken place since 2001. In 2001, a legislation was passed
mandating sound banking practices within the banking community while in
August 2004 banks were mandated to ensure that they apply internal credit rating
methodologies for all types of loans (consumer, mortgage, and commercial) visa-vis applying specific credit rating methodologies for loans to sub-national
governments (states and municipalities). Specifically, credit ratings for
municipalities were required for the granting of credit with substantial loan-loss
reserves required for unrated municipalities. The National Banking and Securities
Commission (CNBV) was obliged to have accurate classifications of loans,
provision for adequate loan loss reserves, provision of additional requirements for
foreclosed assets and establishment of external auditors' independence. In
December 2005, it was mandatory for banks to have at least a risk manager to
control institutional risks coupled with Basel Il's capital standards while at the
same time using credit risk mitigation techniques on loans, guarantees and
collateral. As at March 2006, Mexico had adhered to the 25 Basie core principles
of banking supervision.

'The Secretariat ofFinance and Public Credit (SHCP) is saddled with the responsibility of setting regulatory policyf or
granting and removing banks' operational license and setting capital requirements. The National Banking and
Securities Commission (CNBV) supervises and regulates banks, other credit institutions and securities markets. 77,e
Bank of Mexico (BOM) regulates money,.foreign exchange, and derivatives markets as well payment systems and
financial operations. The Pension Fund Commission (CONSAR) supervises privately managed pension f unds
(AFOREs) while the National Insurance and Sureties Commission (CNSF) oversees insurance companies. The
Institute/or tire Protection ofBanking Savings (!PA B) handles bank resolution, serves as the deposit insurance agency
and disposes offthedistressed banks'asset~ (IMF, 2007:5).
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III.5 Australia
The Australian banking system constitutes about 50 per cent of the total financial
system assets, with four banks controlling about two-thirds of authorized deposittaking institutions' asset. However, the system was adjudged sound by the IMF
financial assessment in 2006. The banking system is characterized by high
earnings, strong asset growth and low level of problem assets and showed high
resilience to adverse shocks. Nevertheless, the system faces a number of
vulnerabilities such as macroeconomic shocks, significant exposure to a highly
leveraged household sector, high dependence on wholesale funding, increased
competitive pressure and overall lack of diversification (IMF, 2006). The
emerging competition in the banking system shifted lending from residential real
estate to small and medium scale enterprises and wealth management and
expansion overseas. This affected the risk profile of banks by not only increasing
the aggregate risks but also by shifting risks from those that are real estate based
into collateralized and foreign risk exposures. Due to declining retail deposit
among the largest banks, risks inherent in large organizations became prominent.
The Australian banks were able to manage liquidity risks because of many factors,
namely: a stable international funding environment; an appropriately flexible
exchange rate policy to absorb stress; banks' efforts to develop alternative sources
of funding and to diversify their funding sources; Reserve Bank of Australia's
recent decision to widen its definition of acceptable collateral, which provided
more flexibility to banks in managing their liquidity risks; and adoption of
prudential standard on liquidity management (IMF, 2007). The monetary
authorities always embark on proactive stress tests on the various categories of
banks in the system. For instance, the five largest domestic banks ran a

macroeconomic stress scenario over a three-year time period while the same
banks ran a series of single factor stress tests on interest rates and mortgage
portfolio stress tests were constantly undertaken on banks that were considered to
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be heavily exposed to the mortgage market. In addition to implementing transborder banking supervision (especially with New Zealand) which reduced
possibility of contagion, since 1997, Australia adopted functional approach to
regulation by consolidating prudential regulation into one functional agency,
market conduct regulation into another and a proactive Council of Financial
Regulators. The Council comprised the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA)
(responsible for payment system and financial stability), Australian Prudential
Regulation Agency (APRA) (responsible for the prudential supervision ofbanks,
insurers and superannuation funds), the Treasury, Australian Investment and
Securities Commission (AISC) and the Australian Transaction Reports and
Analysis Centre (AUS TRAC) (responsible for financial intelligence and ensuring
compliance with money laundering legislation). The forum, which allows for
regulatory coordination and consultation with key actors in the industry,
addresses trends and policy issues in domestic and international financial markets
as well as monitor and evaluate the markets. Australia is at the forefront of
adhering to international best practices; APRA has adopted the principle of
establishing institution-specific capital adequacy of Basel II and has made
adequate preparation for the implementation of other aspects of Basel II
principles. Listed companies disclosure and corporate governance practices are
integral to the supervisory model in the Australian financial system.

III.6 India
Part of the recent financial sector reform is aimed at making the financial system
globally competitive and resilient to shocks. It is essentially aimed at mitigating
risks to the financial system. The key elements of the prudential measures put in
place in recent times include: phased implementation of international best
practices, Credit Asset Ratio (CRAR) /Provisioning / Non-performing Loans
(NPL), Norms / Exposure Limits), strengthening of risk management in the
financial system, roadmap for Basel II, guidelines for ownership and governance,
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Know-Your-Customer (KYC) and A.ML Guidelines, and securitisation and debt
restructuring mechanism norms (Mohan, 2006). In addition to the foregoing,
supervisory measures also include setting up an of autonomous body for
supervision, restructuring of on-site supervision to make it more dynamic and
forward-looking, introduction of off-site surveillance to complement the on-site
supervision, recasting norms on ownership and governance (with particular focus
on external auditors, internal control, strengthening corporate governance and
due diligence on important shareholders) and regulatory cooperation for
monitoring financial conglomerates.
The reform has brought about substantial improvement in the financial system,
notably, increased credit-asset ratio, appreciable improvement in CRAR of banks
- CRAR much above the stipulated level (9 per cent), banks investment in gilts
rose rapidly but has started to decline (albeit still above the minimum
requirement). The emergence of domestic and external financial conglomerates is
creating concern of possible loss of regulatory effectiveness and oversight. In
India, the recent high credit growth associated with growth of asset prices is
generating serious concern which has raised the need to review its prudential
measures to address sectoral concerns.

IV.O Lessons from International Experiences
Evidences from de Gulde, et al (2004), IMF and the World Bank (2005), and
IMF (2003, 2006 and 2007) reveal some key lessons and issues on risk based
management. Some of these lessons include:
• A major lesson from emerging economies that have recovered from
financial crisis of the 1990s and 2000s, have achieved a good degree of
compliance in banking supervision and regulation and better ability of
supervisory authorities to manage the proliferation of financial services,
undertook risk-based supervision and prompt corrective actions, dealt
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with consolidated supervision and cooperated with other domestic and
foreign supervisory agencies.
• Concentrated lending has become an issue of concern in recent times. The
recent global financial crisis emanated from over-concentrated sectoral
lending, especially mortgage lending in the USA.
• Rapid credit growth in countries with weak institutional and regulatory
environment (such as weaknesses in supervision, banks' risk management
systems or weak creditor and property rights) raises the issue of adequacy
of credit risk management systems. This poses the risks of deterioration in
credit quality and asset-price bubbles, which if unchecked could trigger a
systemic vulnerability and crisis as currently being experienced across
many countries including the USA.
• Economic vale stress testing has become integrated financial management
skills of banks. It is extremely important that stress testing is now
incorporated into day-to-day management of the bank and that it is
considered as a part of the risk management department as opposed to the
sole responsibility of central banks in the immediate past.
• Although endogenous dollarization lowers volatility in interest rates, it
however, presents supervision challenges by limiting the scope for
monetary management and lender-of-last resort, constraining the financial
system's capacity to withstand systemic shocks.
• Supervisory capacity of monetary authorities is challenged when corporate
governance is weak. Within the framework of Basel II, sound corporate
governance is all the more relevant in the context of increased reliance on
risk-based supervision and market discipline.
• Information infrastructure, especially internal ratings or ratings of external
credit assessment institutions, is required for meeting the sound
international practice on banking supervision as reflected in Basel II
framework.
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Financial system with dominance of financial conglomerates and
existence of many subsidiaries of foreign banks with weak accounting and
disclosure procedure often pose serious challenge to bank supervision. For
supervision to be effective, domestic supervision needs to be closely
coordinated with foreign supervision.
The extent to which the entire economy is aligned with the development of
securities markets, insurance and contractual savings matters in risk-based
supervision. For instance, the availability of financial products and
services can be complicated by a lack of instruments, inadequate
information and poorly functioning markets, such as interbank, bond,
equity and derivatives markets. Risks become more attenuated in the
presence of deficient economic infrastructure as often reflected in weak
legal, judicial and education systems coupled with absence of economies
of scale and scope usually associated with small financial systems.
The effectiveness of risk-based supervision is undermined in countries
with dysfunctional implementation oflegal and judicial system as it relates
to loan recovery and property rights. These institutional weaknesses
impair creditor rights, development of a credit culture and credit contract
enforcement.
Many economies have initiated pension reforms which have opened up
some form of contractual savings institutions. A potential risk is for banks
to use long-term finance to overheat short-term market operations thereby
creating unnecessary bubbles in the market that could lead to moral hazard
and related financial recklessness.
Within the context of globalization, many countries (e.g. Australia) have
simultaneously experienced strong credit growth and an erosion of their
traditional retail deposit base. This was possible because of increasing
significance of superannuation funds such as pension funds and off-shore
funding. This funding structure is often associated with foreign exchange,
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interest rate and liquidity risk. While capacities of banks to hedge the
foreign exchange and interest rate risks may be high, there are
nevertheless, operational and counterparty risks associated with hedging
activities which need to be monitored. A corollary to this is the liquidity
and roll-over risk which many banks may not have capacity to manage
effectively.
There is need for improved arrangements to manage the failure of financial
institutions and contingency planning for crisis management. This is vital
for confidence building and development of financial credibility.

V.O Implications for Monetary Policy Management in Nigeria
Traditionally, measuring financial risks are passive activities while managing
them is a proactive process. However, recent developments have shown that both
the measurement and management require some level of pro-activism coupled
with adroit skills and competencies. The post consolidation of banks since 2005
and the lull in the capital market since the second quarter of 2008 tend to suggest a
new risk exposure in the Nigerian financial market. Excessive exposure of banks
and financial institutions to the share market could lead to bubbles as was
experienced between 2006 and 2007. However, when the bubble bust, especially
in 2008, the shareholders funds of banks became terribly affected. This could
lead to pyramiding of non-performing loans (NPLs), which the Central Bank is
yet to examine to fully determine the implications of the development in the
capital market on the financial system. This, as a matter of fact, deserves some
serious attention from the monetary authorities.
An emerging issue is high concentration of lending among very few corporate
entities and exposure to offshore borrowing through lending facilities from global
financial institutions. Although, most banks see this as a form of expansion, to the
monetary authorities this should be viewed as a possible source of risk. This was a
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major source of risk that threw the Australian financial system into crisis in the
early 1990s which led to loss of about 36 per cent of shareholders fund. The need
to constantly examine this form of exposure in the context ofthe Nigerian banking
system is, therefore, imperative.
A major ingredient of monetary policy management in the context of financial
development is the development of credit bureau which is currently absent in the
country. To reduce the risks associated with financial sector development, there is
need to develop information infrastructure that could facilitate lowering of
lending costs and to broaden the pool of creditworthy borrowers. This will go a
long way to addressing the weak collateral systems by facilitating the
development of 'reputational' collateral. It is important to promote the
establishment of credit information systems and the institutions that can enhance
access to fmancial services.
Recent development in the global financial system has shown that there is need to
enhance risk management across the fmancial sector's entities. It is also important
to develop robust mechanisms for evaluating banks' portfolios under different
potential stress scenarios. Stress tests need to be designed for each identified risks
across the banking, insurance and capital market sub-sector. The monetary
authorities should constantly subject each entity to stress tests to avoid
debilitating fmancial runs that could lead to systemic crisis.
The growth of Nigerian banks to many West African countries, though presently
does not pose any serious challenge given the relatively low share in Nigeria's
banking assets, however contagion effects from West African banks to Nigerian
individual banks could be more severe than often indicated by the relative size of
their balance sheets. This is more sanguine when the regulatory and supervisory
frameworks in those countries hosting Nigerian subsidiary banks are weaker than
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Nigeria's. Existence of any serious financial difficulties in any country with large
concentration of Nigerian banks (or the subsidiary of Nigerian banks), the effects
on Nigerian individual banks, especially on the funding side, could be substantial.
Even when such difficulties were averted, it could have some reputational effects
on the Nigerian financial system in those countries, especially when only the
Nigerian subsidiaries are affected. Risk of contagion is, therefore, an important
issue under the present financial system. It is also possible to have idiosyncratic
risks associated with economic downturn in countries hosting the subsidiaries as
well as currency swap risks. Given the prominence of contagion risks, it is
important to think of trans-border banking supervision to avert any serious
contagion in the future.
A major lesson that Nigeria should learn from this development is how to manage
risks during pro-cyclicality. Managing pro-cyclicality could be challenging in
developing economies due to the dominance of the banking sector, absence of
alternative viable financial intermediaries, inadequate monetary policy
instruments to manage pro-cyclical imbalances, and emerging nature of the risk
management practices of financial intermediaries. Addressing these challenges
require monetary authorities to do away with 'wait and see' approach by becoming
more proactive in combating pro-cyclicality concerns. Best practice from
emerging economies tends to promote a combination of a risk-based supervisory
framework with a flexible use of"blunt" prudential requirements.
For flexible prudential requirements to work effectively especially to counter procyclical tendencies, it requires effectiveness in risk-based supervision. The need
to adopt flexible and proactive prudential measures is underpinned by the rate at
which banks get around any rule-based prudential requirements, irrespective of
whether they are used for soundness purpose or to counter pro-cyclicality
concerns. The experience ofAsian countries as suggested by (Watanagase, 2004)
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becomes relevant under this situation:

•

Vary capital buffer with changes in economic cycle: During economic
expansion, banks are required to hold capital in excess of regulatory
minimum with a view to drawing down during economic downturn. The
determination of how much "buffer" capital is required will be based on
experience and sound judgment. This will require two explicitly sets of
ratios: a minimum capital ratio (during a normal or downturn situation);
and a minimum targeted capital ratio that is set at a pre-defined level above
the regulatory minimum (for boom period).
• Increase the regulatory credit risk-weights assigned to certain high-risk
assets/sectors: When there is a rapid accumulation of credit concentrations
in certain high risk sectors during boom times, based on experience, it may
be necessary to increase the Basel I risk-weights from 100 per cent to a
higher risk-weight function (i.e. 100 + X per cent; the value of X would
depend on the severity of the risk of the affected sector as judged by the
monetary authorities).
• Adopt forward-looking provisioning requirements: This is a major
attribute ofincentive compatible prudential standards. The main yardstick
for determining the provisioning requirements is the debtors' ability to
repay over an appropriate time horizon. Other factors that should be taken
into consideration include the extent ofloan concentrations; the quality of
loan underwriting standards; and the quality, type, and marketability of
collateral.
• Prescribe loan-to-value (LTV) ratios for the property sector: With this
approach, the supervisory authorities prepare prescribed LTV guidelines
for the property sector, especially during rapid increases in property
values.
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Risk based supervision requires a substantial resource commitment on the part of
both banks and supervisors. Essentially, it requires requisite knowledge, skills,
and abilities which can only be achieved with time and not in a jiffy as most
banking regulatory institutions often expect. This incentive compatible approach
requires adroit skills that can be acquired through training, benchmarking and
rigorous and continuous exposure to best practices across countries with similar
banking and economic structures.
A major requirement is a deep understanding of broader macroeconomic data and
trends, a good insight on the health of the banking sector and a practical hands-on
knowledge ofindividual banks health.
VI.O Conclusion
Recent developments in the Nigerian financial system such as concentrated
lending to few enterprises bubble and burst in the capital market and the
expansion to West Africa and other parts of the globe make the system a good
candidate for risk-based supervision. This is also influenced by the need to expose
banks to pro-cyclicality management. Similarly, the emerging financial
conglomerates have changed the face of prudential regulations globally. Financial
products have gone beyond the traditional deposit-taking initiative to include
banking, insurance and securities businesses. Risk-based supervision is emerging
as an integrated day-to-day management for banks and no more the sole
responsibility of central banks. Managing risk-based supervision requires adroit
skills from the individual bank and the banking supervisors. Mastering such
skills, however, requires the need to answer the following questions. How can
operators use micro-based information to get macro prudential assessment? How
can the central bank build a comprehensive and a consistent framework, taking
into account correlations between the different risk factors potentially affecting
their balance sheets, to encompass the majority of risks borne by banks? How can
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the interdependencies within the financial sector and interactions between real
and financial sector be measured? How can the central bank measure the second
round effects and contagion feedback effects as well as aggregate individual
reactions to shocks? These questions among others should be given serious
consideration.
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